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SALES-CREDIT SALES-APPLICATION OF USURY STATUTES-Plaintiff bought 
a tractor from defendant's agent for $2950 and received a trade-in allow-
ance of $ll80, leaving an unpaid balance of $1770. Defendant's agent 
agreed to arrange for a loan from defendant for the balance of the 
purchase price, without stating a time price for the tractor different 
from the cash price previously discussed. The loan was made, and plain-
tiff signed a note and chattel mortgage in the amount of $2161.84, pay-
able in two annual installments. The $391.84 excess over the balance 
due exceeded the maximum legal rate of interest allowed by Nebraska's 
Installment Loan Act.1 Plaintiff later sued in equity, and the court can-
celled the promissory note and chattel mortgage. Judgment was awarded 
plaintiff for all payments made on the note on the ground that the loan 
was usurious and therefore void. On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska, held, affirmed. The transaction was not a good faith time sale, 
but a device to avoid the operation of the usury statutes, and the note 
and chattel mortgage were void from their inception. Curtis v. Securities 
Acceptance Corp., (Neb. 1958) 91 N.W. (2d) 19. 
Nebraska is one of the few states whose courts have held installment-
sale contracts to be within the scope of the usury statutes.2 In turning 
from the traditional view that usury laws do not apply to conditional sales 
transactions,8 these courts have been motivated to a great degree by 
recognition of the similarity in economic effect between a loan, the 
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. (1952) §§45-114 to 45-162. 
2 Five states appear to belong to tbis group. Arkansas: Hare v. General Contract 
Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. (2d) 973 (1952); Michigan: Hillman's v. Em 'N Al's, 
345 Mich. 644, 77 N.W. (2d) 96 (1956); Minnesota: Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 
13 N.W. (2d) 739 (1944); Nebraska: McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 83 
N.W. (2d) I (1957); Texas: G.F.C. Corp. v. Williams, (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) 231 S.W. 
(2d) 565. 
s E.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 S. 39 (1926); Nazarian v. 
Lincoln Finance Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A. (2d) 7 (1951). See 143 A.L.R. 238 (1943). 
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proceeds of which are used to purchase consumer goods, and a time 
sale followed by a transfer of papers from the seller to a lending in-
stitution.4 In the principal case the court placed great reliance on the 
fact that plaintiff was never quoted a time price as such. Such an approach 
indicates a serious limitation which Nebraska and the other courts ad-
hering to the minority view place upon the application of usury statutes 
to credit sales. The limitation permits a seller to charge a time price which 
exceeds the cash price by an amount greater than would be permissible in 
the case of a loan, if the buyer was informed of the total time price and 
had the opportunity to choose between it and the cash price.5 This 
"bona fide time price" doctrine seems to work at cross purposes with the 
ostensible aim of the minority courts to protect the integrity of the 
usury laws. In light of the policy reasons underlying those laws, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish between a transaction where a total time price is 
stated and one where itemized charges are merely added to the cash price. 
It is true that the requirement of a statement of a total time price may 
help the unwary purchaser and clearly establish his intent to pay the 
greater price. But the purpose of the usury statutes, to limit interest 
charges to the prescribed level regardless of the borrower's agreement to 
pay more, is frustrated whether or not the purchaser is aware of the dif-
ference between cash and time prices. In applying the "bona fide time 
price" doctrine, these courts seem to be attempting to reconcile the 
effect of their construction of the usury statutes with an inherent belief 
that the owner of property should be entitled to sell at the price he 
desires.6 The logical inconsistency to which the minority courts are led 
by this conflict of policy considerations raises grave doubts as to the 
propriety of the extension of protection to installment buyers through 
judicial interpretation of statutes enacted for the most part long before 
the modem phenomenon of widespread credit buying of consumer goods.7 
Policy determinations such as those here involved might best be left 
4 See Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., note 2 supra. But cl. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924), for the classical 
distinction between borrowers and installment purchasers relied on by majority courts. 
See, generally, comment, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1958). 
5 See, e.g., McNish v. General Credit Corp., note 2 supra; Dunn v. Midland Loan 
Finance Corp., 206 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411 (1939). 
6 A good example of collision between these conflicting policies is Sloan v. Sears, 
Roebuck and Co., (Ark. 1958) 308 S.W. (2d) 802, where the majority of the Arkansas 
court held a sale to be usurious where no "time price," as distinguished from the cash 
price, had been stated but a "carrying charge" had been added to the cash price. No 
finance company was involved, and there was full disclosure of all charges. Holt, J., dis-
sented on the ground that the transaction was a bona fide credit sale, made in good faith. 
7 Although the minority view has gained support in recent years, some courts have 
specifically reaffirmed their adherence to the traditional rule. See Brooks v. Auto Whole-
salers, Inc., (D.C. Mun. App. 1953) 101 A. (2d) 255; Bell v. Idaho Finance Co., 73 Idaho 
560, 255 P. (2d) 715 (1953). 
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to the legislatures,8 especially since important and well-established com-
mercial practices are affected.9 Moreover, the position held by the majority 
of courts is not entirely without features for the protection of purchasers 
on credit, as the parties are never allowed to conceal a usurious loan be-
hind the cloak of a conditional sale.10 The traditional view also avoids 
the anomaly of having the validity of the credit sale (perhaps with for-
feiture in the balance) tum upon a choice of words having little effect 
on the true nature of the transaction. 
Jerome S. Traum, S.Ed. 
s Some states nave adopted statutes specifically proscribing excessive interest charges 
in credit-sale transactions. E.g., Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 83, §132. See comment, 58 CoL. 
L. REV. 854 (1958). 
9 In deference to the business practices developed in reliance upon decisions that 
usury laws did not apply to credit sales, the Arkansas court in Hare v. General Contract 
Purchase Corp., note 2 supra, reversed itself prospectively, by caveat. 
10 E.g., Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.'E. (2d) 76 (1954); 
Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 449, 166 P. (2d) 518 (1946); 2 CONTRACTS RE-
srATEMENT §529 (1932). 
